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NSC Review Complete as Redacted.

DCI/ICS 82-4222
28 April 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: [REDACTED]
Director, Intelligence Community Staff

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SUBJECT: Critical Intelligence Problems Committee (CIPC)
Study on Terrorism [REDACTED]

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1. Action Requested: See Paragraph 4. [REDACTED]

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2. Background: The attached CIPC study (Attachment A) contains, in my view, valid recommendations and conclusions. These are strikingly similar to those contained in earlier studies (e.g., the Critical Collection Problems Committee 1977 Report: Intelligence Activities Against International Terrorism). While it can be debated why the problems identified in 1977 still exist, a key factor, I believe, was the lack of aggressive implementation of the recommendations through an authoritative IC mechanism. The newly created Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) can serve as the IC vehicle to take action on the recommendations, and I believe strong encouragement from you would assist the IICT in its efforts. With this in mind, I have attached a memorandum from you to the Chairman, IICT (Attachment B). [REDACTED]

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In a similar vein, aggressive action is needed at the national level to develop clear policy guidance and procedures for a USG counterterrorism program upon which all concerned agencies can focus. Paragraph 5 of National Security Decision Directive #30 (Attachment C) provides that the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), chaired by State, should have responsibility to develop such a program. While this is a step in the right direction, in all candor, similar efforts have been attempted in the past with limited success. As far back as 1972 a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (CCCT) was established by Presidential Memorandum. National level organizational and management issues regarding USG counterterrorism efforts were addressed in Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 30 in August 1977. I believe it would be useful for you to encourage action at the national level and I have included a memorandum from you to Judge Clark to urge such action by the IG/T (Attachment D). [REDACTED]

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3. Staff Coordination: None required. Actions are based on coordinated positions derived from the subject CIPC study. ☐

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4. Recommendations:

A. Approve circulation of the attached study to NFIC for review and comment. ☐


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B. Upon receipt of NFIC views, approve and sign the attached memoranda. ☐

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Attachments: (4)



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21 April 1982

PROPOSALS FOR UPGRADING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFORTS
DIRECTED AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM



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


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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

International terrorism, which is both an intelligence and a counterintelligence problem, poses a complex collection and analytic challenge for the Intelligence Community. The numbers and diversity of terrorist groups, the often sporadic nature and transnational flow of terrorist group activities, and the worldwide dispersion of terrorist group operational areas, makes it an elusive target. Because international terrorism is a government-wide problem, it also poses an equally imposing management challenge--one which has grown steadily as the Washington counterterrorism network, particularly the non-intelligence portion of it, has expanded. 25X1

The individual departments and agencies of the Intelligence Community are better equipped today to address the problem of international terrorism than they were five years ago when the first study of this type was undertaken. This has been a slow process, however, impeded to a considerable degree both by organizational shifts in the Community and by inertia with regard to the management aspects of the problem, the latter fueled by a lack of firm guidance based on a well-defined national counterterrorism policy. The increased priorities accorded the problem since 1979, as well as increases in the threat itself, have fostered organizational shifts that have tended to focus departmental efforts more on international terrorism and paved the way for the direction of additional collection and analytic resources against the problem. Moreover, a wide-ranging series of additional pertinent enhancements, primarily in the collection arena, are presently either under way or planned. 25X1

Despite these improvements, the Community's overall capabilities with regard to international terrorism remain limited. This is due in large part to the scope and nature of terrorism itself, but also to some extent to the fragmented approach the Community continues to take to the problem. To be sure, collection and analytic problems abound which additional resources, both manpower and dollars, would alleviate. But there are long-standing questions of coordination of effort--both within and outside the Community--that should be resolved first in order to promote improved effectiveness and better use of existing resources against the terrorism problem. The study group's recommendations in this regard are outlined below:

- A. The Development of a Mechanism by Which Reporting From Non-Intelligence Agencies is Routinely Made Available to the Intelligence Community. The Community has spent considerable effort devising ways in which its products can be sanitized for use by non-intelligence elements of the US Government in support of counterterrorism. Many of these elements, in carrying out their operational
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responsibilities, obtain information on international terrorist activities which is not routinely made available to the Community. Some of this information would probably fill gaps in the Community's overall understanding of the problem. Resolution of this problem, should it prove difficult, would be somewhat beyond the control of the Intelligence Community. Until the promulgation on 10 April 1982 of National Security Decision Directive Number 30, which, inter alia, establishes a national-level focal point for handling such organizational issues, there existed no effective, authoritative central mechanism to bring the intelligence and non-intelligence elements of the government together to work out mutually supportive programs such as this. This responsibility apparently now falls within the purview of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism chaired by the Department of State.

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- B. Establishment of a Community-wide Program to Exchange Intelligence Production Plans on Terrorism. The production of comprehensive studies and assessments of various aspects of the international terrorist threat is essential to establishment of a sound and uniform basis for both short-term and long-term US Government decisionmaking in response to the terrorist problem. The CIPC study group believes that the timing is right for establishing a formal program to exchange production plans among Community members. It would provide a focal point for the diverse terrorism-related production activities of the Community but still preserve a healthy level of competitive analysis. Such a program would tend to distribute intelligence production across the Community to reduce unproductive redundancy and create a channel for consensus on threat analysis. This program should be coordinated by the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism to ensure that production plans are geared to policy-level needs.

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- C. Data Base Development. There is a need for early interagency consideration of the Intelligence Community's overall data base needs with regard to international terrorism and the degree to which these needs can be met by common or shared data base facilities. As Intelligence Community involvement in counterterrorism has grown, and in the absence of any coordinated Community counterterrorism program, there has been a proliferation of computerized data bases on terrorism tailored to support departmental collection and analytic needs. More are under development. These systems are largely incompatible, impacting seriously on data sharing with regard to the terrorism problem. There is general recognition at the working level that considerable benefit could be derived from access to one another's data base, or possibly from a computerized Community data base on terrorism. It is also recognized that important departmental and legal considerations will have to be addressed carefully in order

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[redacted]

to implement this recommendation. [redacted]

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D.

[redacted]

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- E. Development of Community Contingency Plans. Little effort has been devoted to the development of Community contingency plans for handling either the collection or analytic aspects of a terrorist event. The Dozier kidnapping pointed up the need for increased interagency coordination in this area. A logical starting point in such an effort would be to assign the DCI's Senior Review Panel the task of doing a post-mortem on the Community's ability to respond to that event, drawing, inter alia, from the various "lessons-learned" studies and reviews undertaken by various departments. [redacted]

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- F. Vigorous Follow-Up With Regard to Items A through E. The recent establishment by the DCI of an Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) fills a long-standing need for a Community coordinating body to link together the diverse Community interests concerning international terrorism. It should be the mechanism through which the Community pursues items A through E. A major weakness in past attempts to address similar issues has been lack of follow-up. The Chairman of the IICT should be charged with reporting monthly to the DCI, through the DDCI, concerning progress and problems associated with the above. [redacted]

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- G. Elevation of the DCI's Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism to the Status of a Permanent Committee of the National Foreign Intelligence Council. Obtaining Community agreement on a more coordinated approach to the terrorism problem will be difficult. Many equities are involved and, despite being specifically identified in NSDD-30 as the organization responsible for focusing and coordinating interagency intelligence efforts to counter terrorist threats, the Committee will not have the authority to resolve the really "hard" issues. Elevating the IICT's status to a permanent committee of the NFIC will enhance Community focus on the problem, and give Committee efforts visibility at the highest levels of Community management where resolution of the more difficult issues should ultimately take place. [redacted]

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PROPOSALS FOR UPGRADING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFORTS DIRECTED AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

INTRODUCTION

In late February 1982, in response to a request from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence asked the Critical Intelligence Problems Committee (CIPC) to review the Intelligence Community's present efforts against the problem of international terrorism and to develop proposals for upgrading these efforts as appropriate. This study responds to that request. It assesses the Community's progress in implementing improvements contained in an earlier study bearing DCI approval, summarizes current strengths and weaknesses in our present ability to support policymaker interests with regard to international terrorism, and recommends specific measures that could be taken to further enhance the Community's ability in this regard. ☐

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All NFIC principals with the exception of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the General Counsel of the Department of Commerce were represented in Committee deliberations. The three Collection Offices of the Intelligence Community Staff also participated in the study. ☐

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PROGRESS SINCE 1977

The Intelligence Community has studied the problem of international terrorism in considerable detail over the past five years. The common theme of such efforts has been that, although terrorism poses a complex collection and analytical challenge for the Community, it poses an equally challenging management problem for the US Government--one which has grown steadily as the Washington counterterrorism network has expanded and as Agencies which formerly had no stake in the business of counterterrorism are now very much involved. International terrorism is both a foreign intelligence and a counterintelligence responsibility. It is also an area in which foreign aspects can have direct and serious repercussions in the domestic sphere, especially on matters of concern to US agencies with protective security, law enforcement, or regulatory responsibilities. ☐

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A baseline study of intelligence activities directed against the terrorism problem was undertaken in 1977 by the DCI's interagency Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC).^{*} It found the Community's effort against international terrorism to be "... a fragmented one, neither tightly organized nor closely coordinated in either its collection or analytical aspects." According to the CCPC study, a more coordinated Community approach would: provide much needed focus to departmental programs; promote better organization of Community resources involved; enable rationalization of the Community's work efforts; yield a better and more useful product at both departmental and national levels; and result in improved and more comprehensive support to US Government efforts to combat international terrorism. []

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Progress toward achievement of these goals over the past five years has been uneven at best, frustrated at the outset by internal Intelligence Community events. Central to the course of action recommended by the CCPC in 1977 was the establishment under the CCPC of an interagency subcommittee on terrorism devoted to addressing the most serious of the weaknesses identified in the study. Though established in 1977, the subcommittee's efforts were cut short by the formation of the National Collection Planning Office (NCPO) in 1978, an element of the then newly reorganized Intelligence Community Staff. The NCPO charter was similar to that of the CCPC and the latter--which then the DCI through the Collection Tasking Staff element of the IC Staff--was viewed as redundant and soon became moribund. Although it was recommended at the time that the CCPC subcommittee on terrorism be kept intact and report directly to the DCI, deliberations concerning its future were clouded by the delay in formally disestablishing the parent CCPC,^{**} and the subcommittee withered from neglect. The NCPO had no dedicated effort directed against the terrorism problem. []

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Factors external to the intelligence process contributed to the inertia induced by the withering of the CCPC subcommittee on terrorism, thus providing a further impediment to the establishment of the desired Community approach to the problem. International terrorism is a government-wide problem. While intelligence support is central to any successful counterterrorism effort, the quality of such support is affected directly by the extent of cooperation and coordination attained with the many non-intelligence elements of the US Government having vested interests in--and the ability to report on--the problem. There was during this period no effective, authoritative, central mechanism to give national direction to an overall counterterrorism program

* Intelligence Activities Against International Terrorism, CCPC-D-3/77
June 1977.

** The CCPC was formally disestablished in December 1981. []

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and bring the intelligence and non-intelligence elements of the government together to work out mutually supportive programs. With no one focusing on the management aspects of the problem at the national level, there was little impetus to focus on them at the Community level, particularly prior to 1980 when international terrorism was still a relatively low-priority item for the Intelligence Community. [REDACTED]

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In addition, there was during the period continued focusing of policymaker attention on the crisis management and foreign policy aspects of the terrorism problem almost to the exclusion of consideration of the need for the establishment and maintenance of a credible threat assessment capability. With policymaker attention thus riveted, there developed within the Intelligence Community a perception of a lack of national-level concern with, and policy for, a comprehensive US counter-terrorism program. This perception, coupled with the low priority accorded the terrorism problem until 1979, resulted in limited resources being applied to the problem, and the intelligence effort continued to be largely event-oriented and reactive in nature. As a result, in the absence of a Community focus on the threat assessment aspects of the terrorism problem, Intelligence Community organizations tended to go their individual ways in development of counterterrorism capabilities tailored to support for the most part departmental needs. The scope and nature of terrorism--the numbers and diversity of terrorism groups, the often sporadic nature and transnational flow of terrorist group activities, and the worldwide geographical dispersion of terrorist group operational areas--makes such an unfocused approach against an inherently difficult target less than efficient and effective. [REDACTED]

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Some of the problems identified in the 1977 study have, of course, been tackled successfully. Several legal issues relating to Intelligence Community collection of intelligence information concerning international terrorism identified in the 1977 CCPC study were examined by a panel of representatives from the appropriate departments and agencies. By and large, those issues were based upon ambiguities in the Executive Order and guideline provisions that governed US intelligence activities at that time, as well as the then uncertain application of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts. Since that time, there have been two revisions of the Executive Order and its implementing procedures and guidelines, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has been created by law to authorize electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes in the US, the Government's understanding of and ability to deal with the requirements of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts has much improved, and the Classified Information Procedures Act and various agreements and understandings have been developed to regulate the handling and use of intelligence information in law enforcement investigations and proceedings. There are still rough points in existing implementing procedures and these are being considered in the revision process that is now under way. As a consequence of these developments, while the Constitution and relevant statutes impose outside limits on the extent to which the

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Intelligence Community may collect and disseminate information by certain techniques in particular circumstances, legal issues now appear to be of less concern. Many of the legal considerations that were perceived to be impediments have now been resolved and the adverse impact of those that remain seems capable of resolution. [REDACTED]

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In addition, international terrorism assumed a much more prominent place in the DCID 1/2 priorities listing, and since 1979 the priorities accorded the problem increased substantially. Guidance to field collection elements also underwent considerable improvement, and CIA initiated a conscientious effort to reduce to the extent possible the tight controls on clandestinely acquired information in order to provide wider dissemination to non-agency elements concerned with terrorism. Some basic data base improvements also were made. [REDACTED]

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PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

National Security Decision Directive Number 30, dated 10 April 1982, in addition to establishing a national-level mechanism for managing individual terrorist incidents, specifically identifies the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), chaired by the Department of State, as the national-level organization responsible for developing overall US policy with regard to international terrorism.* The IG/T presently consists of representatives from

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

DCI/ICS 82-4223

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Interagency Intelligence Committee
on Terrorism

SUBJECT: Intelligence Community Counterterrorism Planning

REFERENCE: CIPC Study on Terrorism [] - Attached []

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1. The recommendations contained in the attached study are approved. I look to your Committee to undertake the necessary action to initiate their implementation, monitor progress, and keep me informed. []

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2. As an initial step, I request the preparation of an action plan for implementing each of the first five recommendations (A thru E). The plans should specifically indicate the responsibilities of the participating agencies and include milestones for implementing actions. I would like to review the action plans by 30 July 1982 and receive monthly progress reports thereafter. The Committee will be expected to provide a review of its overall progress after one year. []

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3. Concerning the elevation of the IICT to the status of a permanent committee of the NFIC (Recommendation G), I would like to review a draft DCID in this regard as soon as possible. You should work out the details of this with the Executive Secretary of the NFIC. []

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William J. Casey

Attachment:
a/s

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C

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

82-4829

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April 10, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION
THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Managing Terrorism Incidents

The President has formally approved the attached National Security Decision Directive on Managing Terrorism Incidents. In order to ensure that the Terrorism Incident Working Group is fully capable of executing its function, the group will meet formally for the first time on April 20 at 2:00 p.m. in room 305 of the Old Executive Office Building. Each agency should identify a representative who can be called upon to serve on the Terrorism Incident Working Group and who will be present at the meeting on April 20. Names should be presented in writing by April 16 to Chris Shoemaker, NSC Staff.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



William P. Clark

Attachment: NSDD 30

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Review 4-10-88

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 10, 1982

SECRETNATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 30MANAGING TERRORIST INCIDENTS

The United States is committed, as a matter of national policy, to oppose terrorism domestically and internationally. Efficient and effective management of terrorist incidents is crucial to this commitment. Successful management of terrorist incidents requires a rapid, effective response, immediate access to institutional expertise, and extensive prior planning. Because of these requirements, the management of terrorist incidents of duration will be handled in the following manner:

- (1) Responsibilities. If the gravity of a terrorist incident situation warrants, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at the direction of the Vice President, will convene the Special Situation Group (SSG) to advise the President with respect to decision options on appropriate policies and actions.
- (2) The Lead Agency. The coordination of federal response to terrorist incidents will normally be the responsibility of the Lead Agency. The Lead Agency will be that agency with the most direct operational role in dealing with the particular terrorist incident at hand. It will coordinate all operational aspects of the incident, including press and intelligence. The Lead Agency will normally be:
 - The State Department, for international terrorist incidents that take place outside of US territory.
 - The Department of Justice for terrorist incidents which take place within US territory. Unless otherwise specified by the Attorney General, the FBI will be the Lead Agency within the Department of Justice for operational response to such incidents.
 - The FAA for hijackings within the special jurisdiction of the United States.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency will be responsible for planning for and managing the public health aspects of a terrorist incident and recovery from the consequences of such incidents.

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Review on 10 April 1988

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will resolve any uncertainty on the designation of the Lead Agency or on agency responsibilities.

- (3) The Terrorist Incident Working Group. To support the Special Situation Group, a Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG) will be established. This group will consist of representatives from State, the DCI, DOD, FBI, FEMA and the NSC staff, with augmentation from other agencies, as required. The TIWG will be activated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It will be chaired by a senior representative from the NSC staff.

The purpose of the TIWG is to provide the SSG with direct operational support, to ensure interagency coordination, and to provide advice and recommendations during an incident. The Lead Agency will continue to manage the incident under the direction and coordination of the TIWG and the SSG.

- (4) The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism. The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), chaired by the Department of State, will be responsible for the development of overall US policy on terrorism, including, *inter alia*, policy directives, organizational issues, legislative initiatives, and interagency training programs.
- (5) White House Operations Group. The White House Operations Group, chaired by the Director of the White House Military Office, will have responsibility for issues relating to threats or acts of terrorism directed against the President or the Vice President or senior US officials and protectees as directed by the President. The NSC staff will effect liaison between this group and the IG/T and TIWG.
- (6) The Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism. The Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, chaired by the DCI, will provide intelligence support to the SSG and the TIWG. It will focus and coordinate interagency intelligence efforts to counter terrorist threats. In anticipation of terrorist incidents, the Committee will concentrate on threat alerts, trend assessments, and required procedural improvements, such as more rapid dissemination of critical information.
- (7) Planning and Exercises. In order to ensure effective management of terrorism incidents, prior planning and exercise activity are essential. The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism will be the primary mechanism within the US Government for planning and policy recommendations. To ensure the development of an effective, coordinated interagency exercise program, the Chairman of the IG/T

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will appoint an Exercise Committee which will coordinate the development of a multi-year exercise program and review all multiple agency counterterrorism exercises. This committee will assure that the government's counterterrorism capabilities are maintained in a high state of readiness and that duplication of exercises is avoided. No multiple agency exercise at the national level may be held without the recommendation of the IC/T and the approval of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

This National Security Decision Directive supersedes all previous inconsistent directives and instructions on managing terrorism incidents.

Ronald Reagan

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D

[REDACTED]
The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

DCI/ICS 82-4224

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William P. Clark
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: USG Counterterrorism Efforts

1. In an interim report to you on 22 March I provided a description of Intelligence Community efforts to date against international terrorism, and I indicated that a more detailed review of Intelligence Community activities regarding this problem was being undertaken. The attached study by the Critical Intelligence Problems Committee (CIPC) forwards the results of that review. [REDACTED]

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2. It is apparent from the candid conclusions and recommendations in the CIPC study that the Intelligence Community can improve its efforts against international terrorism in several areas through some management initiatives and without significant shifts in available resources. I have taken steps to implement the recommendations in the study and I will keep you informed of our progress. [REDACTED]

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3. The study also notes a perceived lack of firm guidance for intelligence in support of a well-defined national counterterrorism policy. The manner in which the overall USG counterterrorism program is orchestrated and managed of course has an impact upon the development and scope of the intelligence support role. Though I welcome NSDD #30 (Managing Terrorism Incidents) as a positive attempt to further clarify lines of authority and jurisdiction at the national level, I strongly urge that the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) be charged to develop within a short time frame clear policy guidance, procedures, and a general management architecture on this subject for implementation by involved agencies. [REDACTED]

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William J. Casey

Attachment:
a/s

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